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Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein 
Harold J. Krent* 
and Ethan G. Shenkman** 
The Rehnquist Court's assault on standing doctrine took a new 
twist in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 1 in which the Court invalidated 
a congressional grant of universal standing to citizens under the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA). While professing adherence to 
majoritarian values, the Court trumped a product of the majoritarian 
process. Justice Scalia predicated the Court's decision both on a re-
strictive view of the Article III requirement of a "case or controversy" 
and on a generous reading of the President's authority under Article II 
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully enforced."2 
In a provocative article on Lujan, 3 Professor Cass Sunstein locks 
horns with Justice Scalia's jurisprudence of standing, disputing Justice 
Scalia's analysis of both Article II and Article III. To Sunstein, Lu-
jan' s invalidation of citizen suits finds support neither in history nor in 
the case or controversy requirement of Article III. Congress can cre-
ate, and has created, interests whose violation gives rise to cognizable 
cases and controversies. Sunstein further contends that universal citi-
zen standing in no way interferes with the President's power to "take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."4 Insofar as the Take Care 
Clause imposes a duty to execute the laws as written, he argues, the 
President's power is not compromised when citizens sue to contest 
government illegality. If the citizens prevail, the court would merely 
be enforcing the constitutional obligation of the Executive. 5 He con-
cludes that "the relationship between standing limits and the Take 
Care Clause is at best ambiguous - and in the end, I believe, 
* Visiting Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. - Ed. 
** J.D. Candidate 1994, University of Virginia School of Law. - Ed. We would like to 
thank Susan Bandes, Michael Gerrard, Bill Lewis, Jim McElfish, George Rutherglen, Bill 
Stuntz, and Nick Zeppos for their comments on earlier drafts. 
1. 112 s. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
2. 112 S. Ct. at 2142-46 (quoting U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3). 
3. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 
III. 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
5. When citizens bring suit against private defendants to enforce their obligations under a 
particular statute or regulation, the President's duty to execute the law is not directly implicated. 
Although such suits undoubtedly may interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, that 
interference, as Sunstein points out, supra note 3, at 231 n.300, does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional concern. 
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nonexistent. " 6 
We agree with Sunstein that the President's duty to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed does not prevent Congress from limit-
ing the President's discretion to enforce the laws as he sees fit. Con-
gress can confine that discretion directly or empower private parties to 
contest the President's exercise of discretion in court. But we cannot 
agree with Sunstein's further premise that Article II imposes no re-
straint on Congress' choice of enforcement agents. 
To the contrary, we believe that the structural imperative in Arti-
cle II for a unitary executive precludes Congress from delegating 
outside the Executive's control the power to protect the interests of the 
public as a whole in the face of external or internal threats. Congress 
determines what is public policy, but it must entrust to an accountable 
entity the power to protect that policy - whether through rulemaking 
or litigation - if the interests of the entire nation are at stake. 7 
The power to enforce law, just like the power to regulate, pro-
foundly affects the public weal. Every violation of federal law can be 
considered a breach of the public trust and, in some sense, a threat to 
the public good as defined by the statutory scheme. When Congress 
either creates a cause of action or establishes a remedial scheme, it 
thereby recognizes a public interest in utilization of the prescribed 
remedies. The decisions over when to seek such remedies, what theo-
ries to plead, and what relief to seek implicate public policy.8 
In light of the policymaking inherent in enforcement of federal 
law, Article II prohibits Congress from vesting in private parties the 
power to bring enforcement actions on behalf of the public without 
allowing for sufficient executive control over the litigation. This is not 
to ignore the role of private citizens vindicating individuated rights 
created or recognized by Congress under Article I.9 But Congress' 
6. Id. at 213. 
7. Our notion of the protective power of the President is quite different from that advanced 
by Henry P. Monaghan in his recent article, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1 (1993). Our argument rests not on the presidency's inherent power, but on the struc-
tural directive that Congress can only delegate policymaking to actors subject to control by the 
accountable Executive. 
8. The Supreme Court asserted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), that executive branch 
supervision is necessary not only for criminal prosecution, but also for civil suits seeking to 
vindicate the public interest. The Court held that vesting nonpresidential appointees with the 
"responsibility for conducting civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vindicating 
public rights ..• violate[s] Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution." 424 U.S. at 140. Civil law 
violations, though perhaps less than violations of criminal enactments, threaten the body politic. 
The savings and loan fiasco and junk bond scandal are two notorious examples. 
9. We do not rely on any inherent distinction between private and public interests (or rights) 
- we agree with Sunstein and others, see, e.g., Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui 
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 346 (1989), that injuries to the public at large can readily be 
reconceptualized as injuries to each citizen comprising the public. We rely rather on the distinc· 
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Article I prerogative to structure law enforcement - apart from its 
interest in creating private rights - cannot by itself override the Arti-
cle II interest in unified law enforcement. Thus, Congress must 
choose the Executive, individuals who are injured distinctively, or 
some combination of both to enforce compliance with its dictates. 
In short, we find unfortunate Sunstein's acceptance of the private-
attomey-genera1 concept, which implies that citizens can step into the 
shoes of the executive branch and assume the sovereign's responsibility 
for promoting the public good in litigation.10 Although we are sympa-
thetic to the aims underlying the private-attorney-general model, the 
device is neither compatible with the democratic principles underlying 
the unitary executive nor needed to guarantee compliance with legisla-
tive directives. Congress instead may enact private enforcement 
schemes by creating private, individuated interests, or it can rely on 
public enforcement subject to its own oversight. Congress may not, 
tion between individuated and unindividuated injuries. The Constitution's structure suggests 
that the Executive should redress unindividuated injuries because no single citizen should have 
any greater right than any other to vindicate injuries shared equally by the public as a whole. We 
believe that an analogy to a nationwide class action is apt - only the Executive can be the class 
representative to vindicate the collective interests of the nation. 
Professor Doernberg, in fact, endorses utilization of a nationwide class action device to per-
mit individuals to challenge unlawful government action in the absence of any individuated 
harm. Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People": John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, 
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REv. 52, 110-15 (1985). He proposes 
that courts should certify and monitor such nationwide classes in order to safeguard against self-
interested behavior on the part of class representatives. Although Doernberg's suggestion ad-
dresses the problem of representativeness that we also identify in this essay, we argue that, in 
light of Article Il's mandate for a unitary executive, only a politically accountable agent has the 
authority to represent the interests of a nationwide class in enforcing federal law. 
10. The private-attorney-general metaphor first received currency in Associated Indus. v. 
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). Sunstein is not the first scholar to defend the legitimacy 
of citizen standing based on the private-attorney-general model. Professor William A. Fletcher, 
in an article relied on by Sunstein, argued that: 
In the case of a statutory right, Congress is the source both of the legal obligation and of the 
definition of the class of those entitled to enforce it .... So long as the substantive rule is 
constitutionally permissible, Congress should have plenary power to create statutory duties 
and to provide enforcement mechanisms for them, including the creation of causes of action 
in plaintiffs who act as "private attorneys general." 
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing. 98 YALE L.J. 221, 251 (1988); see also LOUIS L. 
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 499-500 (1965); Scott H. Bice, Con-
gress' Power to Confer Standing in the Federal Courts, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICA 291, 300 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1980); Daan Braveman, The Standing Doctrine: A 
Dialogue Between the Court and Congress, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 31, 54-55 (1980); Caminker, 
supra note 9, at 342-43; Doernberg, supra note 9, at 112; Robert A. Sedler, Standing and the 
Burger Court: An Analysis and Some Proposals for Legislative Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 863, 
881-85 (1977). 
Few commentators have questioned the constitutionality of enforcement suits by private at-
torneys general. For one of the few, see William H. Lewis, Jr., Environmentalists' Authority to 
Sue Industry for Civil Penalties Is Unconstitutional Under the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 16 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,101 (Apr. 1986). Our account differs significantly from that of 
Lewis, however, for we argue that the constitutionality of citizen suits hinges on the individua-
tion of the underlying injury, rather than on the ability of private parties to seek reliefbenefiting 
themselves, as opposed to civil penalties payable to the federal treasury. 
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however, expand the scope of a private interest so broadly that it be-
comes coextensive with that of the public. Some formal boundary is 
needed to discourage Congress from incrementally chipping away at 
the executive branch's control over delegated authority. Recasting cit-
izen suits in terms of private interests therefore both provides the vir-
tue of analytic clarity and imposes some limit on Congress' otherwise 
unbridled discretion to vest public policymaking in unaccountable 
hands. 
After briefly summarizing Lujan and addressing Sunstein's cri-
tique, we explore the concept of accountability underlying the creation 
of a single executive in Article II. We then apply our theory of the 
unitary executive to several examples of broad grants of statutory 
standing, concluding that Congress can confer standing on private citi-
zens only if it specifically articulates and individuates the interests 
whose violation gives rise to a cognizable case. Although we agree 
with Sunstein's view that broad grants of statutory standing do not 
necessarily trench upon constitutional values, we ultimately side with 
Justice Scalia in concluding that universal citizen standing, as in Lujan 
itself, cannot be reconciled with the Constitution - not because of any 
definition of "injury," but because of Article H's establishment of a 
unitary executive. 
I. LUJAN AND THE SUNSTEIN CRITIQUE 
In Lujan, several environmental organizations challenged the le-
gality of a Department of the Interior regulation issued under the En-
dangered Species Act. In a reversal of administration policy, the 
regulation limited the duty of federal agencies to consult with the Sec-
retary over federally funded projects affecting endangered species. 
Under the regulation, agencies must consult over projects in the 
United States or on the high seas, but not over projects overseas such 
as the Aswan Dam in Egypt. 
Justice Scalia, speaking for a majority of the Court, first analyzed 
the plaintiffs' failure to meet traditional, nonstatutory standing re-
quirements. Based on the affidavits of several members who had vis-
ited the habitats of endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka, 
plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary's regulation would compromise 
their interests in returning to the areas and observing endangered spe-
cies. According to the Court, however, the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate that they suffered the requisite injury-in-fact. Although the 
Court agreed that injuries to aesthetic interests could be cognizable, 
plaintiffs' vague plans to return to the affected areas were too remote 
and speculative to satisfy the injury-in-fact test. 
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The Court next rejected the plaintiffs' claim of standing based 
upon a statutory provision entitling "any person [to] commence a civil 
suit on his own behalf ... to enjoin any person, including the United 
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who 
is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter."11 The 
Court recognized that Congress in some contexts may create injuries 
whose violation gives rise to standing, such as "where plaintiffs are 
seeking to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which 
could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs."12 But, in the 
Court's view, 
[v]indicating the public interest (including the public interest in govern-
ment observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Con-
gress and the Chief Executive .... To permit Congress to convert the 
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers' compliance with the 
law into an "individual right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Con-
gress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's 
most important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed."13 
Through citizen standing, Congress could make courts the constant 
monitors of executive action. With each suit, power would flow from 
the Executive to the comparatively unaccountable judiciary. 
Under the Court's analysis, therefore, Congress' grant of citizen 
standing in the Endangered Species Act suffered from two interrelated 
flaws. First, citizens could not meet Article Ill's concrete injury re-
quirement if all they suffered was the intangible harm flowing from the 
Executive's failure to follow the law; second, such suits would invade 
the Executive's province to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed."14 
Sunstein disputes both of Justice Scalia's propositions. With re-
spect to the requirement of a concrete injury, Sunstein first argues that 
the injury-in-fact requirement is only of relatively recent origin and is 
unwarranted given any common sense understanding of a "case or 
controversy" in Article III. Indeed, Sunstein points out that there 
have long been mandamus and qui tam suits in federal court that 
could not survive under the Court's current test. 15 
11. 16 u.s.c. § 1540(g)(l) (1988). 
12. 112 S. Ct. at 2142. 
13. 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
14. In his article, Sunstein demonstrates how the opinion in Lujan should be considered the 
logical outgrowth of Justice Scalia's writings on the separation-of-powers aspects of standing. 
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 209-220. For an example of Justice Scalia's writings, see Antonin 
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REv. 881 (1983). 
15. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 173-77. 
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Second, Sunstein shows that there is no objective way to determine 
what is a "concrete" injury. Congress should be the entity to deter-
mine the sufficiency of injuries, whether the injured party is an object 
or a beneficiary of governmental regulation. Beneficiaries of federal 
regulation can be injured by a failure to enforce laws just as objects of 
regulation can be harmed by enforcement itself. To Sunstein, the 
Court's injury-in-fact requirement is akin to Lochnerizing - the 
Court has permitted Congress to create only interests analogous to 
those recognized at common law. Sunstein concludes that Justice 
Scalia's standing analysis is thus fundamentally undemocratic in frus-
trating Congress' power to articulate nontraditional injuries. 16 
With respect to the Take Care Clause, Sunstein turns Justice 
Scalia's argument on its head. According to Sunstein, the President's 
power to take care to enforce the law does not extend beyond the du-
ties prescribed by Congress - suits to enforce his compliance with 
those laws ensure fidelity to the legislature's commands. In the ab-
sence of such suits, the Executive might act undemocratically in either 
underenforcing or improperly enforcing the terms of the legislative 
mandate. Sunstein concludes that private attorneys general in no way 
threaten the Executive's enforcement of the law.17 Thus, Sunstein em-
braces universal citizen standing, and, in the final part of his article, he 
urges Congress to consider ways to grant citizen standing without di-
rectly violating Lujan. 18 Although we are not as sanguine as Sunstein 
about the efficacy of citizen suits, we have a more fundamental objec-
tion - granting universal citizen standing undermines the principle of 
accountability implicit in Article H's creation of a unitary executive. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF A UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
Like Professor Sunstein19 and Justice Scalia,20 we assume as back-
16. Id. at 183-92. We find Sunstein's argument that Article III imposes no substantive limits 
on Congress' ability to define injuries, id. at 183-93, wholly convincing. See also Fletcher, supra 
note 10. 
17. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 209-15. Even though we agree with Sunstein that congres-
sional authorization for private parties to challenge executive action in most contexts has no 
constitutional dimension, such suits as a practical matter may interfere with executive branch 
enforcement of the laws. Agency officials may waste valuable resources in litigation, and the 
need to justify all of their actions to judges might force them to change the way they execute the 
law to ensure judicial branch approval. With the relatively narrow exception we discuss, infra 
text accompanying notes 94-96, however, the decision of whether to subject the executive branch 
to such suits should be left to Congress. 
18. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 223-36. 
19. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 453 
(1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1267 (1981). 
20. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ground a theory of the unitary executive, which accords a single exec-
utive the responsibility to manifest "energy" in execution of the laws 
passed by Congress.21 As the Federalist Papers summarized, "[e]nergy 
in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good govern-
ment. It is essential to the protection of the community against for-
eign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the 
laws."22 Consolidating power in an energetic executive provides the 
best hope for protecting the public from external threats to the na-
tion's sovereignty as well as from internal threats of violence or expro-
priation. A single executive can implement the laws with greater 
dispatch and, at the same time, stand accountable for all implementa-
tion efforts. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions,23 as well as academic commen-
tary,24 presuppose some variant of the theory. All policymaking and 
enforcement authority delegated to administrative agencies must be 
discharged subject to general supervision by the Executive who, 
through the power of appointment and removal in particular, influ-
ences his subordinates' exercise of such responsibilities. For example, 
Congress cannot direct the Attorney General to disregard the Presi-
21. The Founders' rejection of several proposals to split the Executive was no accident. See, 
e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1179-81 (1992); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: 
A Formalist Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 313, 314-17 (1989); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 196 
(1991); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 573 (1984); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief 
Administrator: The Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 
(1993). 
The theory of a unitary executive derives not only from history, but also from the structure of 
Article II. A single executive enjoys the prerogatives to appoint (and by inference, to remove) 
officers of the United States, to request the opinions in writing of the principal officer in each 
department, to command the military, and to receive ambassadors, as well as to take care that 
the laws are faithfully enforced. 
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
23. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991) (invalidating congressional retention of role in administering state 
compact); Public Citizen v. United States, 491U.S.440 (1989) (construing the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act narrowly to preserve the Executive's Appointment Power); Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding independent counsel statute on the ground that independent 
counsel was subject to general presidential control); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (in-
validating delegation of budget-cutting duties to the Comptroller General, an agent of Congress); 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating congressional interference through one-house 
veto with delegation of authority to Attorney General). 
24. JEREMY A. RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC 
POLICY (1989); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 21; David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers 
After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. Cr. REv. 19; Liberman, supra note 21; Thomas W. Merrill, The Con-
stitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. Cr. REv. 225; Geoffrey P. Miller, In-
dependent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REv. 41; Monaghan, supra note 7; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The 
Role of the Judiciary in Implementing An Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239 
(1989); Strauss, supra note 21. 
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dent's orders in litigation any more than it can instruct the Ambassa-
dor to Russia to report exclusively to its members in negotiating an aid 
package.25 A centralized executive counteracts legislative hegemony 
and promotes accountability by ensuring an avenue of political redress 
for ineffective or foolish governance: by comparison, a plural execu-
tive "tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility."26 
Article H's establishment of a unitary executive, however, is not 
absolute. Rather, Congress' general interest under Article I in struc-
turing law enforcement must be balanced against the interest in ac-
countability underlying creation of a unitary executive in Article II.27 
Although constructing a sensible balance between Articles I and II in 
other contexts may be quite difficult,28 achieving an appropriate ac-
commodation in the context of private law enforcement should be less 
daunting. Congress should continue to enjoy plenary authority to vest 
in private parties the right to vindicate their own distinctive interests 
in court. But when Congress utilizes private attorneys general solely 
to combat the risk of presidential error or underenforcement, the Arti-
25. The scope of Article II is far from academic; questions of presidential prerogative surface 
in every administration. In the waning months of the Bush administration, President Bush 
threatened to fire a member of the Postal Service Board of Governors for refusing to withdraw a 
brief, see Bill McAllister, Bush Steps into Postal Rate Fight: Agency Told to Drop Appeal, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at A25 (Bush directed Postmaster General to withdraw appeal of rate 
decision which it filed without permission of Department of Justice); criticized the independent 
counsel's criminal investigations of his former subordinates, whom he then pardoned, cf. Adam 
Clymer, Bush Criticizes Press Treatment of His Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1992, at A16; and 
threatened to attack qui tam statutes as unconstitutional. Gail D. Cox, Qui Tam Suit is Heavy on 
Technicalities, NATL. L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 8. Although congressional creation of "standing" 
was only directly involved in the last example, all three situations involved a struggle between 
Congress' power under Article I of the Constitution to prescribe the way in which its laws are to 
be enforced and the President's Article II interest in superintending law enforcement. 
26. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 22, at 427. Hamilton continued by noting that 
[i]t often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame 
or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to 
fall. ... The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune 
are sometimes so complicated that where there are a number of actors who may have had 
different degrees and kinds of agency ... it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose 
account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. 
Id. at 428. 
27. The existence of independent agencies, for instance, reflects that balance. The Supreme 
Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-97 (1988), noted the potential tension between 
Articles I and II and adopted a balancing-type test to accommodate the diverging interests in· 
volved in creation of an independent counsel subject to limited presidential oversight. See also 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976) ("Congress could not, merely because it concluded that 
such a measure was 'necessary and proper' to the discharge of its substantive legislative author· 
ity," override other provisions in the Constitution.). 
28. See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (balancing Congress' inter· 
est in open government against the Executive's Article II appointment power); Nixon v. Admin· 
istrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 {1977) (weighing Congress' interest in providing for the 
retention of presidential papers against a claim of presidential privilege); Ex parte Garland, 71 
U.S. (1 Wall.) 333 (1867) (accommodating Congress' interest in ensuring loyalty to the reunified 
nation with the President's Article II pardon power). 
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cle II interest in accountability should prevail - a congressional aim 
to displace the Executive cannot outweigh Article Il's creation of a 
unitary executive. In sum, we advocate in this essay establishing a 
bright-line boundary: Congress may provide for private law enforce-
ment whenever it predicates such enforcement on an individuated in-
terest, but it must permit the Executive to control enforcement when 
only the interests of the nation as a whole are at stake. 29 
A. The Executive's Political Accountability for Redress of 
Public Harms 
The contemporary advantages of a unitary executive for redressing 
harms to the public, whether the threat stems from conduct within or 
without the republic, should be apparent. 3° First, presidential involve-
ment ensures that the political process is open to any concerned citizen 
who disagrees with steps taken to combat public threats.31 Decisions 
as to criminal law enforcement or negotiations with foreign nations 
affect most of us; it would be odd if such significant decisions could be 
pursued by anyone who is not politically accountable. Second, polit-
ical accountability both to Congress and the electorate minimizes the 
potential for self-interested behavior. Those checks are obviously not 
always sufficient, but Presidents recognize that they will have to an-
swer to Congress and the public for enforcement choices, whether in 
dealing with Iraq or prosecuting those who benefited from the savings 
and loan scandal. Third, lodging control over such decisions with the 
President may bring significant advantages in terms of coordination 
and centralization. The Executive often is best situated best to imple-
ment strategies to protect the public weal. The greater the impact of 
29. Although there may well be different ways to strike the balance between Articles I and 
II, Sunstein has eschewed any such effort. In his view, Congress has plenary power to vest 
enforcement authority outside the Executive's control. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 223-36. 
30. Our constitutional argument presents a structural and functional defense of lodging the 
power in the Executive to oversee efforts to redress civil injuries shared equally by all members of 
the public. We do not rely on originalist notions or on historical practice for our analysis. 
Although this is not the place to justify a constitutional theory at odds to some extent with 
historical practice, we note that practice counter to our thesis has become less common with 
succeeding generations. Indeed, the realities of organized crime, international terrorism, a global 
economy, and nuclear war have arguably made a unified executive more critical to the nation's 
security. Given the structural imperative for a unified executive, the changing historical practice, 
and the contemporary advantages of unity, we argue that the Executive under Article II -
despite some historical experience to the contrary - must superintend all efforts to redress 
unindividuated injuries. 
31. Concerned citizens would undoubtedly prefer to vindicate their own interests through 
litigation; but, on the other hand, they may well prefer executive involvement in law enforcement 
to that of unrelated citizens who are not accountable for their enforcement efforts. See infra text 
accompanying notes 57-61, 73-81. · 
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enforcement choices on the public, the greater the public interest in 
centralization of authority and in political accountability. 
In recognition of such advantages, the President stands largely ac-
countable today for implementing Congress' foreign policy goals, en-
forcing federal criminal law, and overseeing compliance with many 
civil regulations. The need for executive superintendence today is per-
haps even greater than it was at the time of the Founding. 
Most prominently, the President's status as Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces reflects his unique role in responding to external 
threats to the public safety, even if Congress largely prescribes the am-
bit of permissible action. 32 Although Congress may constrain the 
President's options in addressing foreign crises, 33 we would not lightly 
accept any congressional effort to delegate responsibility over foreign 
affairs to private parties or states, despite apparent authorization in the 
Constitution.34 Citizens of Virginia would not trust Texas to conclude 
a trade pact with Mexico, and citizens of both states would not likely 
accept a congressional decision to send Ramsey Clark to the Mideast 
with authority to conclude a peace agreement. Not only is a central-
ized executive better able to conduct foreign affairs, but any missteps 
can be challenged through the political process.35 
Similarly, most people today acknowledge the Executive's near ex-
clusive authority to enforce criminal laws protecting against internal 
32. Congress, for instance, not only has control over funding decisions, but also sets the 
framework for appropriate executive responses to foreign aggression. The Supreme Court's deci· 
sion in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), established the principle that the Presi-
dent cannot act counter to legislative instructions even in an emergency. During naval 
skirmishes with France, an American warship seized a French vessel contrary to terms of a 
legislative enactment. Because Congress had "prescribed ... the manner in which this law shall 
be carried into execution," Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the President lacked authority 
to approve the seizure. 6 U.S. at 177-79. 
33. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988) (detailing consultation 
requirements); Boland Amendment IV, Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935-37 (1984) (limiting aid to 
the Contras in Nicaragua). 
34. The Constitution authorizes Congress in Article I, § 8 to "grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal," subject to presidential veto. Congress can also approve state-initiated alliances with 
foreign powers or state-directed hostilities against foreign powers under Article I, § 10, cl. 3. 
The Supreme Court in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 561 (1840), adverted to the 
possibility that Congress could consent to an agreement entered into by Vermont with Canadian 
authorities to extradite fugitives. 
35. Some foreign affairs decisions undoubtedly affect particular individuals more than others 
because of family or business ties. Some individuals subjectively care more than others about the 
Balkans conflict or the Somalian Civil War. Nonetheless, whether or not Congress could consti· 
tutionally vest such individuals with significant authority in foreign relations, we would likely 
prefer executive control as opposed to private, individual statesmanship. From a contemporary 
vantage point, the advantages of consolidation of authority to conduct foreign affairs overrides 
any historical recognition of Congress' power to entrust some authority to entities not subject to 
presidential control. 
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threats to public safety. Executive branch control over federal crimi-
nal law enforcement permits greater discretionary enforcement and 
greater accountability. In a world of limited resources, prosecutorial 
discretion allows the government to gauge the relative seriousness of 
particular crimes and the relative threat posed by individual criminals. 
Few would equate sound policy with the maximum enforcement au-
thorized by law, even if sufficient funds existed.36 A decision not to 
enforce may represent as significant a policy determination as one to 
enforce. Moreover, accountability concerns suggest that the individ-
ual making such determinations be subject to the political process. 
Accountability benefits not only the public as a whole, but the crimi-
nally accused whose very liberty is at stake. 37 
This is not to deny that, as a historical matter, private individuals 
played a far more prominent role in enforcing the criminal laws than 
they do today.38 Individuals may be well situated to enforce criminal 
laws against murder or fraud. Private enforcement in such contexts, 
subject to judicial supervision, might be salutary. 
The shortcomings of exclusive private enforcement - which have 
always existed - have, however, become more glaring with the 
growth of the country and of federal criminal law. For instance, there 
is little reason to entrust private citizens with the prosecution of vic-
timless crimes like drug use or gambling. Even for crimes with identi-
fied victims such as murder or theft, centralized enforcement may well 
generate benefits. The potential for harassment is minimized through 
the process of publicly controlled prosecutions. Furthermore, public 
prosecutors can temper justice with mercy, and only a centralized ex-
ecutive can modulate enforcement of the laws as social conditions 
change. If the President devotes too few resources to combatting drug 
use or insider trading, he or she is responsible at election time for deci-
sions to enforce as well as not to enforce. 
In light of the historical evolution, the Supreme Court stated in 
Morrison v. Olson 39 that all federal prosecutorial efforts must be under 
36. Congress may confine the prosecutor's discretion in various ways, but removing discre-
tion totally is probably impossible, as consideration of any scheme to enforce traffic violations 
attests. Prosecutors must routinely determine which violations to prosecute, what resources to 
devote to particular prosecutions, and which cases to settle. 
37. Because only the sovereign can deprive a citizen of liberty, the need for accountability in 
criminal prosecution is probably greater than in the civil context. The concern for accountability 
might explain in part the evolution toward public prosecution. Overenforcement of criminal 
laws may well threaten social stability more than overenforcement of civil requirements. 
38. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 170-79. Indeed, one of us has noted that the Executive's 
control over criminal law enforcement in the early years of the nation's history was far from 
complete. Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons 
From History, 38 AM. U. L. R.Ev. 275 (1989). 
39. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
1804 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1793 
the President's general control.40 Congress must rely on the President 
to coordinate all criminal law enforcement initiatives just as Congress 
must rely on the President to negotiate with foreign powers. Our 
point is not whether such exclusivity is now constitutionally man-
dated, 41 but rather that the structural advantages of consolidation 
plausibly override Congress' ability to recognize individuals' potential 
interest in the enforcement of the criminal laws. The Supreme Court 
today would not likely permit Congress to vest in bystanders the right 
to trigger and control criminal prosecution.42 
Moreover, and of critical importance to our thesis, centralized civil 
law enforcement offers advantages similar to those in the criminal con-
text. First, consolidating control in the Executive both allows for the 
exercise of discretion to enforce or not to enforce and permits flexibil-
ity in enforcement efforts as conditions change. Second, because of the 
important policy decisions implicit in civil law enforcement, an ac-
countable executive provides an avenue of redress for both targets and 
beneficiaries of federal regulation. As Sunstein persuasively demon-
strates, 43 regulatory efforts can injure both groups, and thus both 
should have a political outlet to vent objections. The desideratum of 
accountability thus militates for executive involvement in enforcing all 
laws passed by Congress. 
B. Accommodating the Unitary Executive with Congress' Power to 
Create Private Rights 
Unlike in the foreign affairs and criminal law enforcement con-
texts, however, the advantages of centralizing authority over civil law 
enforcement have at times been overshadowed by Congress' counter-
vailing interest in conferring enforcement authority on individuals in-
jured by breaches of civil law. Congress, through Article I, 
unquestionably may authorize individuals to redress violations of fed-
eral law when they are injured more distinctively than the public in 
general, whether the injury arises from deprivation of a common law 
40. The need for executive control is understandable given that private enforcement of crimi-
nal laws would be binding on the Executive due to the operation of the doctrine of double jeop-
ardy. Private prosecution, therefore, precludes future executive branch prosecution. As we 
discuss infra notes 78-80 and text accompanying note 101, private prosecution of civil suits may 
or may not bar the Executive subsequently from filing its own suit. 
41. But cf Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (uphold-
ing private prosecution in unique criminal contempt context). 
42. For instance, the Court presumably would not have upheld the constitutionality of the 
independent counsel statute if the counsel were outside the government. Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654 (1988). Indeed, the Court stressed in Morrison that the President's control over the 
independent counsel saved the statute from invalidation. 487 U.S. at 692-93. 
43. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 198-199. 
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or statutory interest. 44 Congress thus relies on both public and private 
enforcement to ensure compliance with its dictates. 
By authorizing private enforcement, Congress may accomplish at 
least two objectives. First, Congress may encourage individuals to 
participate in lawsuits affecting their future under a system of private 
rights. Principles of self-determination and autonomy support that 
role. Second, Congress may determine that the Executive cannot be 
trusted to represent adequately the interests of those individuals in-
jured more distinctively than the nation as a whole.45 Thus, even 
though individuals affect the public interest when vindicating their 
own rights, whether in the antitrust or environmental field, the ac-
countability concerns underlying the unitary executive give way to the 
private rights created by Congress. 
Congressional creation of injuries whose violation gives rise to a 
case or controversy, such as with "testers" in civil rights statutes, 46 
reflects a similar objective to provide for effective law enforcement.47 
Due to special interest group pressure or due to myopia, Congress may 
prescribe an ineffectual enforcement system, but Sunstein correctly ob-
serves that there is generally no constitutional dimension to that deter-
44. Although the limits of Congress' ability to delegate policymaking outside the government 
remain unclear, compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating grant of 
power to miners and producers under Bituminous Coal Act to establish minimum wages) with 
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989) (sustaining delegation to private beef pro-
ducers under Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990), 
Congress may at a minimum empower private parties to vindicate their own interests through 
lawsuits, even if the public as a whole is affected by the suit. The delegation of enforcement 
authority likely poses less of a threat to accountable governance than does delegation of general 
policymaking authority. For instance, Congress' decision to vest private individuals with the 
authority to enforce compliance with the Endangered Species Act is less problematic than if 
Congress instead were to appoint the Sierra Club to write regulations under the Act. Nonethe-
less, enforcement choices reflect significant policy judgments, as the Supreme Court has often 
noted. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 821 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 
(1976). 
45. Resource concerns, for instance, might counsel against bringing suit, as might the oppos-
ing interests of a more powerful element of the electorate. 
46. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(d), 3612(a) (1988); Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982) (violation of congressionally created interest in re-
ceiving truthful housing information gave rise to cognizable injury). 
47. Congress under Article I enjoys wide latitude in establishing the mix between public and 
private enforcement of its directives. In some instances, as under§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § I 125(a) (1988) (creating a federal statutory tort for unfair competitive practices, includ-
ing false or misleading advertising), Congress relies primarily upon private parties for enforce-
ment of the law. Private enforcement may be preferred in many settings, particularly when 
questions of causation and remediation are readily ascertainable and the systemic impact of the 
injury is minimal. In other contexts, such as under sections 203 and 205 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702, 1704 (1988), Congress relies exclusively 
upon the executive branch. For a classic discussion of the optimal mix of private and public 
enforcement, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975). 
1806 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1793 
mination.48 Every vindication of a private interest recognized by 
Congress carries with it some vindication of the public interest as well. 
But if only the government or public at large has been injured, the 
President should be accountable for legislative directives to protect the 
public welfare, despite the historical experience to the contrary.49 
Congress' interest in effective law enforcement cannot by itself over-
ride the Article II interest in accountability; otherwise Congress could 
bypass the executive branch whenever "necessary and proper."50 Just 
as Congress presumably cannot delegate to private individuals the au-
thority to regulate workplace safety or environmental hazards nation-
wide, 51 so it cannot, consistent with Article II's establishment of a 
unitary executive, delegate to a disinterested citizen the power to pros-
ecute violations of safety or environmental regulations. A private at-
torney general has no greater interest in law enforcement than he or 
she has in law administration generally. The Constitution's preference 
for democratic decisionmaking demands that decisions about how best 
to redress injuries to the general public should be left to actors who are 
politically accountable. 
This view of the unitary executive reveals where we part company 
with Sunstein. Although private citizens in circumscribed contexts 
may benefit from rights granted by Congress, Congress should not be 
able to confer upon private citizens the general power to vindicate 
rights shared by the public as a whole. That responsibility is vested in 
the President and is thus subject to the checks of the political process. 
If there were no constraints upon Congress, the Executive would be-
come too easily divided, and accountability for vindicating the public 
interest too diffuse. 
To be sure, the line we suggest between individuated and 
nonindividuated injuries may seem arbitrary. Because Congress 
through careful drafting can recognize individuated interests in almost 
every conceivable context, our insistence that it not be permitted the 
48. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 186-93. 
49. See notes 34 & 38 supra. 
50. See supra note 27. Thus, we do not advocate a case-by-case assessment of the competing 
executive and legislative branch interests at stake in a particular enactment. Rather, we believe a 
categorical accommodation to be more appropriate. 
51. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), the Court held that the delegation 
of policymaking authority to private parties was "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious 
form." See also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (criticiz-
ing delegation of policymaking authority to private groups). Although the Court has not ad-
dressed the issue recently, it would not likely have sanctioned congressional delegation of the 
budget-cutting authority it prohibited the Comptroller General from exercising in Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), to a private individual. Nor would the Court likely have upheld as 
constitutional the creation of a sentencing commission outside the government altogether. See 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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further step of authorizing private enforcement of unindividuated in-
terests may seem quite formalistic. We agree, for instance, that Con-
gress can create or recognize interests that are shared by much of the 
populace. Just as Congress may conclude that the President would 
not adequately represent in litigation the interests of a private individ-
ual suffering a discrete injury, so it might determine that the President 
would not adequately represent the interests of a diffuse majority in-
jured by either private or governmental conduct. 52 
But we believe that line drawing is absolutely essential in accom-
modating Congress' power to provide for private law enforcement 
with the establishment of a unitary executive in Article II. 53 Without 
an enforceable limit, Congress could circumvent the executive branch 
in providing for enforcement of criminal statutes as well. Indeed, if 
Congress can vest private individuals with the power to represent the 
public in litigation, it is but a small step to permit Congress to vest in 
private individuals the authority to bind the public through regulation 
or other aspects of law administration. The requirement of individua-
tion, therefore, merely demarcates the outer boundary of Congress' 
power to delegate enforcement authority to private individuals. Con-
gress must select the Executive to represent the entire public in litiga-
tion, just as it must do so for rulemaking or general policymaking. 
Moreover, requiring Congress to be explicit about the interests it 
creates will force the legislature to pay greater heed to issues of ac-
countability and representativeness, encouraging Congress to think 
twice about the hazards of authorizing unaccountable citizens to rep-
resent broad-based interests in civil law enforcement. The more ex-
plicit Congress must be in defining the injury, the more likely that the 
decision will be thoroughly debated and considered in the democratic 
process. Forcing Congress to define those injured with greater speci-
ficity should minimize both representativeness problems, by alerting 
52. We therefore disagree with Justice Scalia's position, see Scalia, supra note 14, at 894-97, 
that courts should refuse to permit those vindicating majoritarian interests to obtain judicial 
redress. The judiciary is ill equipped either to ascertain what is a majoritarian interest or to 
determine when individuals sharing such interests should be relegated to the political branches 
for relief. Both objects and beneficiaries of regulation, for example, may at times constitute a 
majority of the populace. But when no individuated interest exists, Congress lacks the power to 
vest enforcement authority outside the Executive. 
In contrast, courts conceivably should have more say in determining if majoritarian processes 
can redress constitutional injuries - whether individuated or not - depending on the nature of 
the constitutional right at stake. We do not address in this essay the Executive's role in re-
dressing constitutional violations. 
53. As we discussed earlier, supra note 9 and accompanying text, principles of self-determi-
nation and autonomy do not support private rights of action when the private interests to be 
protected are shared equally by the entire populace. If the injury is individuated, however, Con-
gress should have discretion to determine whether majority or minority interests are best repre-
sented through a private, public, or mixed enforcement scheme. 
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all affected individuals of their rights, and collective action problems,54 
by circumscribing the class of those injured. 
C. The Danger of Executive Underenforcement of the Laws 
Our proposed accommodation of Article I with the unitary execu-
tive would admittedly remove one check upon the Executive's under-
enforcement of the law. The President, for instance, might decline to 
enforce laws protecting endangered species. Congress has turned to 
citizen suits in part to combat that risk of underenforcement. Unlike 
Justice Scalia,55 we do not believe that the President is constitutionally 
privileged to refuse on policy grounds to enforce the laws passed by 
Congress. 
But the remedy of citizen standing is neither necessary nor fool-
proof. Congress hardly lacks the capacity to force the President to 
take more vigorous action. Congress can call agency officials to ac-
count for inaction before oversight committees, threaten funding cut-
offs in other areas, or hold up executive appointments. Moreover, 
Congress in most instances can create individuated interests to enable 
private citizens to sue when a lack of governmental enforcement in-
fringes upon such interests. 56 Although universal citizen standing to 
challenge threats to endangered species, in our view, would not be 
consistent with Article II, creating an injury in all those who have 
visited habitats to observe such species should pass constitutional 
muster. 
Employing private attorneys general to combat the risk of under-
enforcement also creates the risks of overenforcement and arbitrary 
rule. First, private parties may have self-interested reasons for bring-
ing suit. Business representatives may file False Claims Act suits57 
against competitors, or private groups might sue for their own pecuni-
ary gain, irrespective of the public importance of the suit. Such citizen 
suits may well preclude other citizens from subsequently suing on 
S4. The larger the class represented, and the smaller the interest of each class member, the 
more that collective action problems prevent members from exercising any control over their 
agents in litigation. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role 
in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 
S8 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 20 (1991) ("[C]ollective action and free-rider effects allow the plaintiffs' 
attorney in class and derivative cases to operate with nearly total freedom from traditional forms 
of client monitoring."); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: 
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, S4 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987). 
SS. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 897. 
S6. See supra text accompanying notes 44-4S. 
S7. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see also infra text accompanying notes 
98-104. 
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their own behalf.58 No one has elected private attorneys general to 
represent the rest of us, and there are no political checks on their exer-
cise of power. Their interpretations of controlling federal law and 
their strategic decisions in litigation may not redound to the public 
benefit.59 
Second, even if the private attorneys general are as enlightened as 
Cass Sunstein may be, they lack the information and experience of the 
Executive in determining which violations to target and which reme-
dies to pursue. Maximum enforcement may not be the best strategy to 
achieve the overarching legislative goals. Further,. private attorneys 
general cannot modulate enforcement as conditions change - even if 
one group decides not to bring a particular action, another group may 
nonetheless file suit. 60 
Third, if universal citizen standing is permitted, then Congress 
could presumably select which individuals or groups it trusts to vindi-
cate the public interest. Whether Congress selects the National Rifle 
Association, Public Citizen, or individual members of Congress as en-
forcement agents, 61 other citizens are excluded, and Congress may too 
easily control the exercise of delegated authority. Combining in Con-
gress the authority to make binding policy with the discretion to apply 
it on a case-by-case basis threatens the basic scheme of separated pow-
ers, circumventing one of the critical checks on legislative power in the 
Constitution-that Congress cannot enforce the law. Thus, by creat-
ing citizen standing, Congress may in effect choose specific groups to 
serve as a substitute executive, and those groups' decisions as to whom 
58. Plaintiffs under the Clean Water and False Claims Acts have extracted from businesses 
favorable settlement terms that did not necessarily serve the public interest. See infra notes 74 & 
101. Judges may not be able to police such self-interest, depending upon the terms of the statu-
tory mechanism. Congress may authorize courts to exercise discretion in approving settlements, 
but it has rarely if ever directed judges to scrutinize a private attorney general's motives for 
bringing suit. 
59. Indeed, under the False Claims Act, private relators shape doctrine in an area of continu-
ing importance to taxpayers, unconstrained by concern for future litigation. Relators may raise 
issues that harm the government in subsequent cases, or they may insufficiently perceive the 
importance of doctrinal twists. See, e.g., Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 810 
(D. Utah 1988) (government knowledge of false claims bars suit). Moreover, taxpayers indirectly 
subsidize all such losing efforts because some defendants can recapture the expense of defending 
suit by including such costs in the overhead they charge to their governmental contracting part-
ner. See False Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and 
Government Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1990) 
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Gerson). 
60. See infra text accompanying note 77 & 93. 
61. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (noting that Congress in the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act delimited the groups that could challenge the constitutionality of the Act). 
Indeed, some have counseled Congress to take a more active role in enforcing the law through 
lawsuits, at least when the Executive's actions arguably affect Congress' rights. See, e.g., Carlin 
Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweights?, 54 U. Prrr. 
L. REV. 63, 119-27 (1992). 
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to target for enforcement, and what penalties to seek, are not subject 
to sufficient political checks. 
Ill. APPLICATION OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY TO 
CITIZEN SUITS 
To examine the ramifications of the unitary executive on citizen 
standing, we address three contexts in which Congress has conferred, 
and will likely continue to confer, broad statutory standing: (1) envi-
ronmental citizen suits against private, regulated entities; (2) manda-
mus-type citizen suits to compel executive agency compliance with the 
law, as in Lujan; and (3) qui tam suits in which private relators redress 
governmental injuries. These contexts illustrate how Congress, by en-
acting universal citizen suit provisions, not only may undermine ac-
countability in the enforcement of public-regarding legislation, but 
also may compromise private rights by delegating to private individu-
als the ability to bind their peers. 
First, consider environmental citizen suits against private "pol-
luters" to enforce their permit requirements. The Clean Air Act 
(CAA), for instance, authorizes "any person [to] commence a civil ac-
tion on his own behalf" against any entity "who is alleged ... to be in 
violation of" certain regulatory requirements, including any emissions 
limitation contained in its permit. 62 By authorizing enforcement suits 
by "any person," Congress has apparently granted standing to any 
plaintiff who can make a good faith allegation of the defendant's viola-
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Sixty days after notifying the defendant and 
state and federal agencies of their intent to sue, see 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), 
any person may bring a suit in federal district court for the district in which the source of the 
pollution is located. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(l) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The plaintiff may seek 
injunctive relief, the imposition of civil penalties, or both. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. II 
1990). In addition, the 1990 amendments inserted language authorizing citizen suits for wholly 
past violations. As of November 15, 1992, any person may bring suit against entities who are 
"alleged to have violated" their permits, "if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been 
repeated." 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (a)(l), (3) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). But cf. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act did not 
authorize "citizen suits for wholly past violations"). 
Many other environmental statutes contain similar citizen suit provisions that authorize "any 
person" to bring enforcement actions against private defendants. See, e.g., Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1988); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988); Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § l,1046(a)(l) (1988). Statutes not in the environ-
mental area that contain similar broad grants of standing include the Consumer Product Safety 
Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C. § 2060(a) (1988) (granting standing to "any person adversely affected •.• 
or any consumer or consumer organization") (emphasis added); the Federal Trade Commission 
Improvements Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(l)(A) (1988) (conferring standing on "any inter-
ested person (including a consumer or consumer organization)"); and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvements Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l(t)(l) (1982) (conferring standing on 
"[a]ny interested party") (no longer in effect as of Sept. 30, 1983). 
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tion. 63 Plaintiffs would not have to demonstrate that they suffered a 
distinctive injury-in-fact to challenge the violation. 64 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Students Challenging Regu-
latory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 65 seemed to endorse the view that 
Congress can confer universal standing. In SCRAP, the Court held 
that plaintiffs had standing66 to redress an injury to the public's gen-
eral interest in clean air, and that such a suit could be brought by "all 
who breathe [the] air."67 Professor Sunstein adopts a similar notion in 
one of his "proposals" for a legislative response to Lujan. He recom-
mends that Congress explicitly create a universally held property in-
terest - a "tenancy in common" - in some environmental asset, 68 
such as the conservation of clean air, pristine areas, or endangered 
species.69 Yet, in property law, one owner of collective property can-
not unilaterally take legal action binding others' interests in that same 
property; either unanimity or a prior governance agreement is re-
quired. 70 If we are correct about the structural and functional values 
63. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976) (Clean Air 
Act citizen suit provision eliminated need to demonstrate independent standing), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 902 (1977); Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 
F.2d 809, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that when Congress determines that "any person" is the 
appropriate party to bring suit, citizens group had standing without showing an injury-in-fact); 
see also Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1005-08 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that 
citizen suit provision of Marine Mammal Protection Act obviated need to consider traditional 
tests of standing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); National Wildlife Fedn. v. Coleman, 400 F. 
Supp. 705, 710 (D. Miss. 1975) (reading Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision to confer 
"automatic standing on any person claiming a violation" of the Act), revd. on other grounds, 529 
F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). 
64. Some courts have read stricter standing requirements into statutes that on their face seem 
to confer standing on an unlimited class of persons. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[I]nexorable interrelationship between 
standing and ... Article Ill" precludes interpreting the Clean Air Act to allow "standing with-
out a prior showing of 'injury in fact.'") (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98 (1981)); see also 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1045 (8th Cir. 1988) (Bowman, J., dissenting) 
("Surely Congress did not intend [the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision] to be read 
in a vacuum, without regard to constitutional [Article III] limitations.''). This raises the issue of 
whether the courts must demand a clear statement of the injury Congress is creating, or whether 
the courts may narrow the class of persons with standing to those who can demonstrate individu-
ated injuries. See infra text accompanying note 111. 
65. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
66. Plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. III 1993), and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4321-4370a (1988). 
67. 412 U.S. at 687. Most commentators and courts now view SCRAP as an aberration from 
the Court's standing jurisprudence and limit the holding to its facts. 
68. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 234-35. 
69. Alternatively, environmental citizen suit provisions may be conceptualized as conferring 
a more abstract collective interest in the proper enforcement or administration of the law. See 
generally Bice, supra note 10, at 293; Sedler, supra note 10, at 878-80. For our analysis, see 
discussion of mandamus-type citizens suits, infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
70. Indeed, some governing structure is needed to avoid the collective action problems plagu-
ing any large-scale system of jointly held property. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory 
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inherent in the unitary executive, the Executive must be the agent of 
the national community to redress collectively held harms. 71 
Experience with citizen suits under another environmental statute, 
the Clean Water Act (CWA),72 illustrates the potential drawbacks of 
authorizing private, unaccountable citizens to enforce the law on be-
half of the public. Private enforcers lack the information and ability to 
foster optimal compliance with a regulatory scheme as complex and 
far reaching as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES).73 Centralized agencies (state or federal) can determine 
which violators to target and, by carefully choosing among enforce-
ment options and remedies, can employ an enforcement strategy that 
will achieve the greatest overall gains in water quality. 74 In fact, the 
of Property Rights, 19 AM. EcoN. AssN. PAPERS & PROC. 347, 3S4-S9 (1967); cf. Carol Rose, 
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, S3 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 711, 719 (1986). 
71. See generally RABKIN, supra note 24; see also supra text accompanying note 49-SO. 
72. We draw upon the CWA for illustration because of the far greater number of actions 
against private defendants that citizens have brought under the CWA, as compared with the 
CAA. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part III, 14 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,407, 10,424 (1984). Public access to industry self-monitoring 
reports made CWA suits extremely cost efficient for environmental groups. See Adeeb Fadil, 
Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking up the Pace, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23, 66-69 (198S). 
We should note that the CWA qualifies its citizen suit provision by authorizing only those 
who have "an interest which is or may be adversely affected" to bring suit. 33 U.S.C. § 136S(g) 
(1988 & Supp. 1990). By including this language, Congress probably intended the CWA to incor-
porate the standing requirements enunciated in Sierra Club v. Morton, 40S U.S. 727, 739 (1972) 
(holding that a special interest in environmental policies is not sufficient to constitute injury 
under the Administrative Procedure Act; plaintiffs must allege a specific injury). See Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 4S3 U.S. 1, 16 (1981). This qualifica-
tion has not significantly limited the ability of environmental groups to bring actions, however, as 
the courts have been extremely lenient in recognizing injuries-in-fact in CWA cases. See, e.g., 
Gonzales v. Gorsuch, 688 F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1982) (Section SOS of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197S, U.S.C. § 136S(a)(2) (1988), was "intended to grant 
standing to a nationwide class, comprised of citizens who alleged an interest in clean water."). 
This raises the interesting question of whether, under our account of Article II and the uni-
tary executive, Congress can salvage the constitutionality of universal citizen suit provisions sim-
ply by limiting standing to "any person whose interests are adversely affected." This generic 
language could suffice, as long as the statute made clear that the phrase was referring only to 
individuated interests. The drawback to this approach is that it relinquishes control over plain-
tiffs' standing to the Court, which has been steadily shrinking the contours of injury-in-fact; 
Lujan represents the latest shrinkage. This objection, however, begs the central question of this 
essay: How far beyond the Court's delineation of "injury-in-fact" may Congress expand standing 
for private enforcers? 
73. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
74. Certainly, government agencies are in the best position to use limited enforcement re-
sources most efficiently. But even in a world of unlimited enforcement resources, maximum 
compliance may not be optimal in all situations, and agencies can adjust enforcement to attain 
the Act's ultimate objectives more effectively. The agency has the ability to pursue less severe 
options, such as negotiating informally or issuing administrative orders, before seeking injunctive 
relief or civil penalties in court. When faced with certain de minimis violations, the agency may 
choose to abstain from enforcement altogether. In exchange for flexibility and consistency in 
enforcement policies, the agency can expect greater voluntary cooperation from industry. 
Active private enforcement, while supplying additional enforcement resources, can also lead 
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NPDES regulatory scheme encourages citizens to bring inefficient 
suits. Citizen suits do not necessarily target the worst actors or the 
most severe environmental problems. 75 
The Clean Water Act experience also highlights the risk of self-
interested behavior by private parties in bringing suits. Several studies 
document the widespread practice of environmental groups seeking 
contributions to private causes in lieu of payments to the federal treas-
ury in settling citizen suits. 76 While some groups may seek funding for 
environmentally sound projects, there are no assurances that all such 
projects in fact will be socially beneficial. Other individuals bringing 
suit may lack even the pretence of serving the public interest. Thus, a 
private enforcement scheme compromises the public good by both 
eliminating the gains of centralized enforcement and removing a check 
on self-serving actions. 
The greater the preclusive effect of such citizen suits, the greater 
the problems with unaccountable representation. Although the extent 
to which citizen actions are preclusive on other citizens is unclear, the 
first plaintiff to file suit will at least partially impede actions by future 
plaintiffs. If the first plaintiff loses on the issue of liability, for in-
stance, that judgment is likely to affect through stare decisis any future 
action based on the same alleged violation. On the other hand, if the 
first plaintiff wins and the court imposes civil penalties, the court is 
unlikely to allow another citizen suit for the same violation, even if the 
second plaintiff believes that the penalties imposed in the first case 
to counterproductive results. For instance, if industry cannot expect flexible responses to de 
minimis violations, the costs of setting initial permit requirements will rise. In general, the less 
industry can rely on agency oversight, the less the agency can informally bargain for greater 
cooperation and voluntary compliance. See Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Pros-
ecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked 
Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REv. 337, 400-02 (1988); Barry Boyer & 
Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits 
Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985); Theodore L. Garrett, Pros 
and Cons of Citizen Enforcement, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10162 (1986). 
75. Because the Act holds violators strictly liable and accrues penalties based upon the 
number of permit violations per day, see 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), environ-
mental groups have an incentive to sue defendants with the highest number of violations, regard-
less of the seriousness of the violation. Furthermore, since citizens can rely on agency 
compliance data in court, they have no incentive to perform their own monitoring or investiga-
tion in order to discover undetected violations, which may be the most important cases to prose-
cute. See Blomquist, supra note 73, at 402. 
76. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 74; Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of 
Environmental Law, 65 TuL. L. REV. 339 (1990); David S. Mann, Comment, Polluter-Financed 
Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under 
the Clean Water Act?, 21 ENVTL. L. 175 (1991). Congress further legitimated the practice of 
diverting penalties to private, environmental causes with a special provision in the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2) (Supp. II 1990) (authorizing payments of up 
to $100,000 for "beneficial mitigation projects" in lieu of civil penalties). 
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were insufficient. 11 
The problems with preclusion are exacerbated by the possibility of 
a "sweetheart" settlement, particularly under the Clean Air Act, in 
which a citizen suit for a wholly past violation78 results in a consent 
decree requiring payment to a "socially beneficial" project. The pay-
ment may constitute only a fraction of the potential civil penalties. To 
the extent that the consent decree bars79 future citizen suits based on 
the same set of facts through res judicata, the public would have no 
recourse. The first citizen to sue would have the ability to bind the 
rest of us to his or her resolution of our collective injury. Admittedly, 
the preclusive effects of sweetheart settlements are mitigated by the 
fact that the CAA preserves the government's right to bring its own 
suit. 80 One could imagine, however, a citizen suit provision that had a 
preclusive effect on the government as well - the worst case scenario 
for the preservation of Article H's accountability principle. 81 
77. See generally JEFFREY G. MILLER, CmZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FED· 
ERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 92-94 (1987) (suggesting that citizen suits should preclude all 
future suits for same violation). 
78. Under the 1990 Amendments, citizens may bring suit for wholly past violations ifthere is 
evidence that the alleged violations had been repeated. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. II 
1990). Citizen suits for ongoing violations would not preclude future suits because the statute 
considers each day of violation to be a separate and distinct violation of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7413(e) (Supp. II 1990). 
79. Citizen suits could have a res judicata effect under the theory that plaintiffs acting in the 
capacity of private attorneys general are in privity with other plaintiffs acting in the same capac· 
ity. Otherwise, defendants might be subject to an unlimited number of citizen suits for the same 
violations, at least until the maximum liability for each violation was exhausted. While we could 
find no cases in which a court found that citizen suits precluded other citizen suits, several cases 
involve the preclusion through res judicata of citizen suits by government actions. In one case, 
EPA v. City of Green Forest, Ark., 921F.2d1394, 1403-05 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 414 (1991), the government brought an action more than 60 days after a citizens group filed 
suit. The government, therefore, had exceeded the period during which it could have automati-
cally preempted the citizen suit by bringing a "diligent" prosecution of its own. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Nonetheless, the court held that EPA's consent decree with 
defendant, entered before the culmination of the citizens' litigation, barred the citizens' claim 
under the doctrine of res judicata. The court reasoned that, as private attorneys general, the 
plaintiffs had only an abstract interest in enforcement - an interest that was shared with and 
adequately vindicated by the government. 921 F.2d at 1403-05. Courts could apply similar rea· 
soning to hold that the first suit brought by a private attorney general bars any subsequent suit by 
citizens acting in the same capacity. 
80. The Act provides that the government is not bound by the outcome of any suit to which 
it is not a party. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990). Some, however, have argued that 
the government should logically be bound ifit had notice of the suit. MILLER, supra note 77, at 
92-93. 
81. Even ifthere is no requirement of individuated injury in the Clean Air and Clean Water 
Acts, the statutes nonetheless may provide the EPA and DOJ with enough supervisory control 
over citizen suits to satisfy Article H's demand for accountability. Both Acts permit the govern· 
ment to preempt citizen suits by diligently pursuing its own civil action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) 
(1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). Both authorize the EPA to intervene at any 
"stage in the litigation. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(2) (Supp. II 1990). 
Finally, both require the courts to consult with the Department of Justice and the EPA before 
issuing consent decrees. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(3) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(3) (Supp. II 
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To illuminate the difficulties raised by environmental citizen suits, 
consider a hypothetical statute, the "Ozone Depletion Act," strictly 
regulating the manufacture and use of all ozone-depleting chemicals. 
Assume that the nation collectively shares the protection afforded by 
the ozone shield. On whom does Congress have the authority to con-
fer standing to enforce the statute? 
Congress could not create universal citizen standing consistent 
with Article II - that is, standing for "any person" - either by creat-
ing a collectively held legal interest in the ozone layer or by defining 
"injury-in-fact" as an increased risk of skin cancer.82 But what if, in 
an attempt to satisfy the individuated injury requirement, Congress 
granted standing exclusively to the following parties: (1) anyone 
whose last name is Smith; (2) Friends of the Ozone, an environmental 
"public interest" organization; (3) anyone who has an above average 
susceptibility to skin cancer from solar radiation; or (4) "any person," 
but only to sue on behalf of persons who suffer individuated injuries? 
In the first example, by specifying that the "Smiths" have standing, 
Congress is differentiating the class of plaintiffs who can sue, but not 
the underlying injury to be redressed. Because there is no logical con-
nection between one's surname and one's level of exposure to radiation 
or risk of cancer, Congress essentially would be delegating responsibil-
ity to one particular group to vindicate the undifferentiated public in-
terest in being free from any increased risk of cancer. While all 
persons named Smith are no more or less representative of the public 
than any other randomly selected class of persons, the Smiths who 
come forward with suits may be more likely to press some idiosyn-
cratic view. 83 The Smiths in the world, however, are in no way ac-
countable to the rest of us for their efforts to protect the ozone layer. 
A similar analysis applies to the Friends of the Ozone example, 
except that here, Congress has authorized a special interest group to 
litigate on behalf of the public at large. While Friends of the Ozone 
may have an unique interest in and a high level of expertise about 
1990). On the other hand, the government cannot prevent a suit from being brought in the first 
place. Nor does the government have the resources to intervene in every case that warrants 
government supervision. Our purpose, however, is not to suggest how much supervisory control 
is constitutionally sufficient, but rather to demonstrate when Article II requires executive 
supervision. 
82. Assuming all persons would experience at least some increase in cancer risk from ozone 
depletion, the injury produced by a violation of the Act would not be differentiated among the 
population at-large. Although an increased risk of cancer may constitute a cognizable injury, the 
problem is that the injury is shared equally by the whole nation. 
83. See generally the analysis of public interest litigation in Burton A. Weisbrod, Conceptual 
Perspective on the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 4 (Burton 
A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1971). 
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pollution in the biosphere, its members are no more representative of 
the public than are the Smiths. The public did not elect Friends of the 
Ozone, 84 and there is no assurance that the group's interests match 
those of the general public. Indeed, Congress may have selected 
Friends of the Ozone because of campaign contributions or because of 
Congress' belief that it can influence that group's enforcement 
choices.85 
The third example, creating an interest in being free from an above 
average risk of skin cancer, falls comfortably within Congress' power. 
Congress has created an interest that would give rise to a clearly indi-
viduated injury: by definition, no more than half the population could 
claim to have their legal interests invaded by a violation of the Act. 86 
These citizens would have standing to vindicate their individual 
interests. 87 
To be sure, any scheme of private enforcement involving broad 
grants of standing, even if based on individuated injuries, will face the 
84. Even though Congress may in a sense be responsible for its choice of enforcement agents, 
it does not remain directly accountable for the authority exercised by these agents. Such author-
ity cannot be readily linked, in the public eye, to Congress and will not be subject to the same 
internal checks of bicameralism and presentment. The checks and balances applicable to legisla-
tion or to the executive branch's exercise of delegated authority are simply not present. For 
similar reasons, most academics have decried the demise of the nondelegation doctrine. See 
generally Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. 
U. L. REV. 277 (1987). Thus, a policy decision to use private enforcement agents does not assure 
that the subsequent exercise of that delegated authority is itself sufficiently constrained. 
85. Michael Greve contends that citizen suit provisions in effect create an off-budget subsidy 
for national environmental advocacy groups, who are, practically speaking, the only "citizens" 
with the capacity to bring enforcement actions. See Greve, supra note 76. Such an arrangement 
may create an uncomfortably close relationship between the legislature and law enforcement. 
The imperative to segregate lawmaking from law enforcement explains why Congress may not 
delegate enforcement powers to its own members. See, e.g., Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. 
v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho) (striking down statute 
that conferred standing to members of Congress to contest the appointment of Judge Mikva), 
affd. sub nom., McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981). 
86. Here we differ from Justice Scalia, who believes that all "majoritarian" harms should be 
redressed by the political branches and that responsibility for vindicating "minority" interests 
should be left to the courts. See Scalia, supra note 14, at 895. In contrast, we believe that 
Congress can better determine which interests need political resolution, within the confines of 
Article Il's mandate for a unitary executive. See supra note 52 for how our account of statutory 
standing differs from that discussed in Scalia's article. 
87. So long as the statute identifies the individuated interests at stake, Congress can specify 
some of the classes of plaintiffs who have standing to sue. For instance, in the Ozone Act, 
Congress may want to provide a nonexclusive list of plaintiffs deemed to have an "above-aver-
age" risk of skin cancer from ozone depletion - for example, former skin cancer patients; people 
who live in high altitudes or other regions identified as high risk; or workers who are constantly 
exposed to the sun. Selecting specific classes of plaintiffs may create due process problems, how-
ever, if the effect is to exclude other persons who may be injured in the same way. See supra text 
accompanying note 61. Courts should therefore ensure a relatively close fit between the injury 
recognized and the class of those authorized to bring suit: otherwise Congress, by defining the 
class of those entitled to sue, could evade the individuation requirement. 
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potential problems of self-interested or inefficient enforcement dis-
cussed above. 88 Moreover, if these Ozone Act citizen suits precluded 
other suits, the ability of the first plaintiff to bind everyone else who 
shares his or her injury might threaten basic principles of fairness and 
due process. 89 Our point is not that private enforcement becomes wise 
policy when Congress creates individuated interests. Rather, when 
plaintiffs seek to redress individuated injuries, the pitfalls of private 
enforcement simply do not implicate Article II. 90 
In the fourth example, Congress attempts to create broad statutory 
standing not by widening the scope of the interests protected, but by 
authorizing uninjured third parties to vindicate the rights of others. 
Because the interests at stake in example three are individuated, citi-
zen suits do not violate the Article II accountability principle. None-
theless, citizen suits in the last example threaten to compromise 
fundamental values of fairness and due process. There is clearly a pri-
vate right at stake; the only question is whether one plaintiff has a 
sufficiently close relationship to the injured party to represent that 
party in litigation. 
The courts have treated the general bar against third party stand-
ing as a "prudential" matter. That is, the courts only reluctantly al-
low plaintiffs to vindicate the rights of absent third parties, even 
though they recognize Congress' authority to expand jus tertii to some 
extent.91 We do not think, however, that Congress may go so far as to 
create a blanket rule under which all citizens have the right to sue on 
behalf of individuals injured more distinctively by ozone depletion. 
Professor Lea Brilmayer has pointed out that serious due process 
and autonomy concerns arise when ideological plaintiffs - challeng-
88. See discussion of citizen suits under the Clean Water Act, supra notes 74-81 and accom-
panying text. 
89. An analogy may be drawn to class action suits. Class actions bind the members of a 
class, but only if certain due process safeguards are in place. For instance, the class must be 
defined narrowly to ensure that the members are similarly situated and the representative party 
must be capable of"fairly and adequately protect[ing] the interests of the class." FED. R. C1v. P. 
23(a). Additionally, for classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must ensure that all class 
members receive adequate notice and be given the opportunity to opt out. FED. R. C1v. P. 
23(c)(2). 
90. Congress can employ a variety of procedural safeguards to mitigate the due process 
problems involved in any scheme of citizen enforcement, especially where such suits have a 
preclusive effect on other citizens. For instance, the statute may provide for protections similar 
to those found in the class action context, see supra note 89, for the opportunity of any injured 
party to intervene as a matter or right, see Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(h)(2) (1988) (providing the right to intervene whenever a citizen 
suit impedes the ability of a nonparty to protect its distinct interests), and for encouraging the 
submission of amicus presentations. See also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 227 (1990) (arguing that a departure from the private rights model of adjudication does not 
have to intrude on individual rights). , 
91. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975). 
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ers who are not members of the injured class - have standing to liti-
gate constitutional claims that may affect third parties through stare 
decisis.92 Similarly, in our fourth example, citizens who are not them-
selves injured would be able to initiate litigation that may create unfa-
vorable precedent for injured persons, even though the injured parties 
may have wished subsequently to bring their own actions. The injured 
parties would also be subject to the decision to bring the action in the 
first place, a decision that they may not have desired. To the extent 
that these Ozone Act citizen suits could not only adversely affect, but 
could also actually preclude others from vindicating their own 
rights,93 the suits would clearly violate basic due process values. 
To summarize, our analysis of environmental citizen suits provides 
Congress with a choice between placing enforcement control in the 
hands of the accountable Executive or in the hands of private parties 
who are vindicating their own distinct injuries. Although we believe 
that Congress should have near plenary power to determine what is a 
cognizable interest, Congress may not give the authority to redress 
unindividuated inter~ts to some or all private citizens. 
In addition to citizen suits against private parties, Congress has 
also authorized citizen suits to compel the Executive to carry out its 
duties under the law. Most environmental statutes authorize this type 
of mandamus action.94 In Lujan, for instance, the plaintiffs sought to 
compel the Secretary of the Interior to rescind a regulation that they 
argued was contrary to the Endangered Species Act. Our analysis of 
standing in Lujan is essentially the same as our analysis of environ-
mental citizen suits against private defendants: Congress cannot con-
fer standing merely by fashioning a commonly held interest in lawful 
governance by the Executive. 
Indeed, in one sense, citizen suits against the Executive pose an 
even greater risk of unaccountable governance than do suits against 
private defendants under the environmental statutes. Unlike in the 
92. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Contra· 
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306·310 (1979). 
93. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
94. As with suits against private defendants, many environmental statutes authorize "any 
person" to challenge the legality of various types of executive agency actions. See, e.g., Endan· 
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l)(A) (1988) (permitting any person to bring suit to en-
join any government agency that is alleged to be in violation of any provision of the Act); Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (authorizing any person to compel the 
Administrator to perform nondiscretionary duties under the Act); Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C § 1,1046(a)(I) (1988) (same). Some statutes 
also specifically authorize "any person" to invoke judicial review of agency rulemaking. See, e.g., 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a)(l) (1988). As with suits against private de-
fendants, some statutes limit citizen standing to persons whose interests may be "adversely af· 
fected." See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (g) (1988). 
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Clean Water Act context discussed above, decisions on behalf of the 
entire public are made exclusively by private plaintiffs without the 
safeguard of a subsequent suit by the executive branch. Since the Ex-
ecutive is itself bound by the results of the suit, the rest of the public 
cannot count on a subsequent lawsuit by a democratically accountable 
agent to ensure that the public interest is served. Mandamus actions 
therefore plausibly pose more of a threat to the principles of accounta-
bility and representativeness. 
Sunstein might retort that it would make little sense to give the 
Executive a special role in vindicating the public interest in the Execu-
tive's own lawful governance. 95 Although there may be an inherent 
conflict of interest in this context, the conflict cannot justify empower-
ing unaccountable private citizens, with no personal interest at stake, 
to decide for the rest of us how the executive branch should interpret 
its duties under the law.96 Otherwise, Congress could in effect em-
power private individuals to act as shadow executives in representing 
the entire nation in litigation, fragmenting the unitary executive. Both 
the plaintiffs and the defendant would claim to represent the public 
interest, and the judiciary would then need to choose which version of 
the public interest to accept - that proffered by the Executive or that 
proffered by the private plaintiff. As long as no individual rights are at 
stake, the principle of accountability is far better served by retaining 
control over executive enforcement in the hands of the politically ac-
countable Chief Executive, subject to congressional oversight. 
Furthermore, just as in the Clean Water Act, Congress may create 
individuated injuries to encourage suit against the Executive. Con-
gress clearly could amend the ESA to confer a cognizable interest in 
the survival of an endangered species on any person who within the 
past ten years has visited the habitat of that species. Any threat to 
that species' survival would create a discrete injury in those persons 
and thus give rise to standing, without any further need of proof of 
causality or immediacy. In the absence of individuated harm, how-
ever, universal citizen suits to enforce the Executive's compliance with 
the law cannot be reconciled with a unitary executive. 
95. Indeed, Sunstein notes that the Executive has little to fear from judicial oversight in light 
of the doctrine of deference articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Sunstein supra note 3, at 217. But, irrespective of the extent 
to which Chevron protects the Executive, see Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992), we believe that only citizens seeking to redress individu-
ated injuries, as opposed to perceived breaches of the public trust, should be able to challenge 
executive action. Political accountability demands at least that much. 
96. A similar conflict of interest arose in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). The Court 
held that criminal prosecution of executive branch officials must nonetheless remain subject to 
general executive branch control. 
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Our analysis also suggests the potential invalidity of qui tam provi-
sions, which allow private relators to bring civil enforcement actions 
on behalf of the United States and share in any ultimate recovery. Qui 
tam suits pose no insuperable Article III obstacle, for the government 
has suffered injury at the hands of the defendant. A concrete injury 
and adverse parties exist. The question is whether Congress can assign 
the government's injury to a private relator without impinging upon 
the Article II principle of accountability.97 
For instance, under the False Claims Act,98 which contains the 
most significant qui tam provision in effect today,99 private individuals 
may prosecute cases of fraud against government contractors. too Once 
resolved, the suit precludes both the government and other private 
parties from suing to redress the same injuries. The injury to the fed-
eral government equally affects all who are subject to its jurisdic-
tion.tot Under our theory, the Executive must therefore retain control 
over all False Claims Act suits to ensure accountability for efforts to 
redress injuries suffered by the government. t02 In the absence of exec-
97. Prior to enactment of citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air and Water Acts, individuals 
attempted unsuccessfully to restrain violation of environmental laws through qui tam suits. See 
generally Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972). Like 
citizen suits, qui tam actions provide a means through which citizens can help enforce the laws 
irrespective of the executive branch's position. 
98. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
99. The first Congress created numerous qui tam statutes to help enforce postal laws, liquor 
laws, and the like, and subsequent Congresses followed suit. These provisions typically did not 
allow for control by the Executive. 
100. Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (Supp. III 1991), private relaters must notify the government 
of their intent to sue, and the government may elect to intervene and take over the action within 
60 days of notification. If the government declines to intervene, private parties may control the 
litigation and are generally entitled to between 25 and 30% of the proceeds if they prevail. The 
government can intervene at a later date in the litigation by showing good cause. If the govern-
ment intervenes, then the relater can recover between 15 and 25% of the proceeds, and the 
government has the right to direct the litigation, though the relater remains a party. For other 
qui tam provisions still on the books, in which less governmental control is assured, see 25 U.S.C. 
§ 201 (1988) (enforcing Indian protection laws); 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (1988) (false marketing of 
patented goods). 
101. Admittedly, Congress might be able to create competitor standing, which would be 
individuated, on the theory that overcharges by companies against the government give those 
companies an unfair competitive edge. 
102. Similarly, Congress cannot delegate to private individuals the right to bring suit based 
on legislative restrictions on the Executive's constitutional authority, including both the appoint-
ment and removal power. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (authorizing such suits). 
Congressional authorization for any person to sue on behalf of the executive branch is even more 
problematic than qui tam statutes, for it threatens the Executive's control over its own Article II 
powers. Even if the executive branch could intervene in any lawsuit, its discretion not to chal-
lenge particular intrusions on its power is lost. Moreover, the Executive might not be able to 
settle a suit according to the principles it favors. Full control over litigation surrounding its own 
prerogatives would be lost. 
Congressional delegation of the executive branch's injury to the public represents a special 
case of jus tertii standing. JJ.1St as Congress cannot assign citizen A the right to bring suit on 
behalf of citizen B in the absence of a special connection between the two, so Congress cannot 
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utive supervision, private relators may readily manipulate qui tam 
suits to benefit themselves financially at the public's expense.103 Given 
the protections afforded the Executive under the Act, 104 however, 
Congress arguably left sufficient control with the Executive. 
Sunstein nonetheless proposes that Congress grant bounties to suc-
cessful citizen plaintiffs without allowing for participation by the Ex-
ecutive. Sunstein argues that "a system of bounties would fully 
overcome the post-Lujan doubts about the citizen suit."105 We cer-
tainly agree to the extent that such suits would be consistent with the 
requirement of a case or controversy, but only because a case or con-
troversy exists independent of the bounty. Under the False Claims 
Act, the underlying injury giving rise to the case or controversy is 
suffered by the government, not the relator. A bounty therefore does 
not alter the nature of the injuries to be redressed in litigation, but 
rather creates a stake in its outcome, much like an attorney hoping for 
a contingency fee might enjoy. Just as Congress cannot create an indi-
viduated injury merely by differentiating the class of those who can 
assign citizen A the right to bring suit on behalf of the executive branch or the government as a 
whole. Although private citizens in circumscribed contexts benefit from the structural protec-
tions in the Constitution, Congress should not be able to confer upon disinterested private citi-
zens the general power to vindicate the executive branch's rights. Otherwise, Congress can in 
effect bypass the executive branch and entrust litigation over governmental injuries to private 
parties, directly threatening the unitary executive. 
103. See, e.g., United States ex rel Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident 
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding that, once the United 
States declines to intervene in False Claims Act action, it can no longer object to the terms of any 
subsequent settlement, even if the settlement specifies no recovery to be allocated to the United 
States); Brief for Appellant United States as Represented by the Department of Justice, at 5-7, 
United States ex rel Gibeault v. Texas Instruments Corp., No. 92-55760 (9th Cir. filed June 10, 
1992) (relator reached private monetary settlement of suit contingent on dismissal of qui tam suit 
with prejudice, with no money to be paid to the Treasury); Brief for Appellant United States as 
Represented by the Department of Justice, at 6-10, United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. North-
rop Corp., No. 92-55863 (9th Cir. filed July 2, 1992) (relator attributed most of his recovery from 
settlement to wrongful discharge claim as opposed to false claims allegation, minimizing amount 
to be paid to Treasury). False Claims Act suits have also been initiated by business competitors, 
see, e.g., Irvin Industries, Inc. v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., No. 87 Civ. 4444 (S.D.N.Y. May 
20, 1992), and even by disgruntled members of the same family. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., 
Inc. 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993). 
104. See supra note 100. Our purpose is not to address precisely how much control is consti-
tutionally sufficient, but rather to suggest when Article II requires that such controls - however 
ultimately defined - be exercised by the Executive. See also Caminker, supra note 9 (defending 
the constitutionality of qui tam provision in False Claims Act). 
105. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 232. Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia has adverted to 
the possible constitutionality of such bounty schemes. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2143. According to 
Justice Scalia, a monetary reward apparently converts a generalized grievance into an individu-
ated stake in the controversy. Presumably then, Congress could offer a $1.00 bounty to legiti-
mate citizen suits in all contexts - whether in enforcing environmental requirements, 
challenging executive illegality, or redressing fraud against the public treasury. We do not think 
the Article II interest in accountability can be circumvented by so simple an expedient. Surely, a 
unitary executive, and not a bounty hunter, is the proper representative when the public's rights 
as a whole are at stake. 
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redress injuries suffered by the public as a whole, 106 so it cannot create 
individuated injury by assigning the right to sue on behalf of the public 
to the highest bidder or to the first bounty hunter on the scene. Thus, 
Sunstein's proposed system of bounties - like the qui tam mechanism 
- fails to create individuated injury, and the absence of any means to 
ensure coordination by the Executive undermines the principle of ac-
countability implicit in Article II. 
CONCLUSION 
In our view, the constitutional linchpin of statutory standing is in-
dividuated injury, whether based on common law or contemporary 
notions of injury. The Article II principle of accountability prevents 
Congress from utilizing private attorneys general to vindicate interests 
shared by the public at large. 
Our analysis may shed new light on Justice Kennedy's concurring 
opinion in Lujan. Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy was not will-
ing to reject broad statutory standing. Rather, he voted to deny stand-
ing because Congress had refused to "identify the injury it seeks to 
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring 
suit,"107 even though he readily conceded that "Congress has the 
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before."108 Jus-
tice Kennedy noted, however, that "there is an outer limit to the 
power of Congress" to confer statutory standing, such as with "citi-
zen-suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper 
administration of the laws. While it does not matter how many per-
sons have been injured by the challenged action, the party bringing 
suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal 
way."109 
Justice Kennedy's approach, though analytically divergent from 
ours, 110 may similarly preserve Article II values of accountability. Far 
106. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
107. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
108. 112 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
109. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
110. Justice Kennedy rests his analysis on the concrete injury requirement in cases or contro-
versies. That requirement would apparently be met if Congress explicitly created an interest in 
the future survival of an endangered species in Egypt. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring). But Justice Kennedy does not believe that Congress can grant standing merely by creating 
an interest in the proper enforcement of the laws, even if the class of individuals benefited is 
discrete. We do not understand why the latter interest is any less concrete than the former. In 
contrast to Justice Kennedy, we believe that an injury need not satisfy a test of "concreteness," 
but of individuation. And that requirement in our view flows from Article II and not Article III. 
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from merely demanding specificity, as Sunstein suggests, 111 Kennedy's 
approach demands individuation, which is also central to our analysis. 
Requiring Congress to "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate" with 
particularity, as well as requiring it to "relate the injury to the class of 
persons entitled to bring suit," serves two purposes. First, much like a 
clear statement rule, Justice Kennedy's approach requires Congress to 
consider more fully the underlying Article II value of accountability 
before creating standing in a large group of citizens. Congress must 
determine on a case-by-case basis whether societal vindication of pri-
vate rights outweighs the advantages that might otherwise flow from 
centralized enforcement. If Congress concludes that private enforce-
ment is warranted, it must then structure the grant of standing in a 
way that identifies an interest particular to a discrete segment of the 
population.112 Second, delimiting standing to a class of citizens who 
share a particularized injury minimizes the risk of unaccountable gov-
ernance. The more discrete the group, the less the collective action 
problem, and the greater the potential that each plaintiff will have 
some say in the litigation. 
In sum, we argue for a middle ground between the positions staked 
out by Sunstein and Justice Scalia. At one end of the spectrum, Sun-
stein would sanction universal citizen standing, irrespective of the lack 
of individuated injury. He denies any special role to the Executive in 
redressing harms suffered by the public at large. At the other end, 
Justice Scalia would apparently prohibit Congress from recognizing 
nontraditional injuries, whether in enjoyment of animal life or in the 
failure to enforce laws affecting the opportunity to enjoy animal life. 
Our view of Article II suggests instead that statutory standing should 
be proscribed only when Congress delegates unindividuated injuries to 
citizens Sunstein, the unaccountable guardians of the public weal. 
111. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 230-31. 
112. If Congress designates the class of those who may sue to vindicate such injuries, courts 
must ensure that the class is sufficiently related to the specified injury. See supra note 87. 
